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Scholars have explored the rise of far-right reactionary political parties in Europe over the last decade. However, social movements reflecting similar political orientations have rarely been conceptualized as "reactionary." To better understand the political orientations of reactionary transnational social movements such as the Identitarians and the Defence Leagues, we explore how and why ethnonational symbols derived from the medieval period are utilized by adherents. This interdisciplinary investigation argues that, through processes of mediated political medievalism, ethnonational symbols are used as strategic framing devices to reimagine an idealized "golden age" of distinct European nations, to assign blame for the erosion of ethnonational identity through multiculturalism, immigration and "Islamization," to establish an intergenerational struggle against the supposed incursion of Islam in Europe, and to proscribe and justify the use of violence as a means of re-establishing the primacy of European nations.

This article shows that organised transphobia is promoted using similar strategies and politics as the wider reactionary movement which has become increasingly mainstream. In particular, we outline the transphobic process of 'othering' based on moral panics, which seeks to construct, homogenise and exaggerate a threat and to naturalise it in the bodies and existence of the 'Other'. Reactionary politics rely on authoritarian tendencies and strategies which aim to remove the rights of certain communities, and as such threaten wider demands for equal rights. They claim to speak on behalf of 'the people', in this case often (certain) women, against an elite which seeks to grant unfair rights and privileges to a mostly silent and silenced minority, even though said rights are precarious and limited, and power is rarely on their side. Rather than a bottom-up movement in defence of women, what we refer to as 'organised transphobia' is a top-down movement that relies on prominent platforms and privileged access to shaping public discourse to divert attention away from the real struggle most women and LGBTQ+ people are facing conjointly.

Are Tea Party supporters merely a group of conservative citizens concerned about government spending? Or are they racists who refuse to accept Barack Obama as their president because he's not white? Change They Can't Believe In offers an alternative argument that the Tea Party is driven by the reemergence of a reactionary movement in American politics that is fueled by a fear that America has changed for the worse. Providing a range of original evidence and rich portraits of party sympathizers as well as activists, Christopher Parker and Matt Barreto show that what actually pushes Tea Party supporters is not simple ideology or racism, but fear that the country is being stolen from "real Americans", a belief triggered by Obama's election. From civil liberties and policy issues, to participation in the political process, the perception that America is in danger directly informs how Tea Party supporters think and act

Scholars have explored the rise of far-right reactionary political parties in Europe over the last decade. However, social movements reflecting similar political orientations have rarely been conceptualized as "reactionary." To better understand the political orientations of reactionary transnational social movements such as the Identitarians and the Defence Leagues, we explore how and why ethnonational symbols derived from the medieval period are utilized by adherents. This interdisciplinary investigation argues that, through processes of mediated political medievalism, ethnonational symbols are used as strategic framing devices to reimagine an idealized "golden age" of distinct European nations, to assign blame for the erosion of ethnonational identity through multiculturalism, immigration and "Islamization," to establish an intergenerational struggle against the supposed incursion of Islam in Europe, and to proscribe and justify the use of violence as a means of re-establishing the primacy of European nations.

A polemic against an influential trend in Japanese Marxist economics, focusing on the theory of enrichment. The sources of ideological disenfranchisement of Japanese Marxists is traced to their penchant for theoretical hermeticism & their divorce from social movements. Japanese Marxists lack the theoretical apparatus & political sensibility to comprehend Japanese prosperity as well as to recognize oppressions at home & abroad. Thus, while maintaining scientific pretension, they fall prey to the dominant ideology of "Japan as number one.". Modified AA

During the 1980s and 1990s in countries across the globe, new populist protest movements and radical political organizations emerged to challenge traditional parties, ruling elites, and professional politicians, and even long-standing social norms. The revolts against politics-as-usual have arisen from many kinds of social groupings and from diverse points on the political spectrum. Through the 1980s, in Western and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, Asia, and North America, populist discontent erupted intermittently. But the end of the Cold War, particularly in Europe, unleashed a torrent of popular movements and political parties opposed to what the discontented perceived as the corruption and deceitfulness of the political classes and their corporate patrons. Some protest movements promoted more democracy, pluralism, and economic opportunity; some expressed intolerance, bigotry, and xenophobic nationalism. Adapted from the source document.

During the 1980s and 1990s in countries across the globe, new populist protest movements and radical political organizations emerged to challenge traditional parties, ruling elites, and professional politicians, and even long-standing social norms. The revolts against politics-as-usual have arisen from many kinds of social groupings and from diverse points on the political spectrum. Through the 1980s, in Western and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, Asia, and North America, populist discontent erupted intermittently. But the end of the Cold War, particularly in Europe, unleashed a torrent of popular movements and political parties opposed to what the discontented perceived as the corruption and deceitfulness of thepolitical classesand their corporate patrons. Some protest movements promoted more democracy, pluralism, and economic opportunity; some expressed intolerance, bigotry, and xenophobic nationalism.

At this moment in time, the very future of democracy in America has become a serious question. Many journalists and commentators have raised questions of crisis of White, Christian, male authority that impel an 'illiberal democracy', one-party rule, and/or a new civil War. The wave of progressive movements in the 1960s, resurgent in the 21st century, and challenging traditional, essentialist, identities and values were experienced by many as threats and dangers, fostering fears, anxieties, and grievances that elicited backlashes engendering various reactionary movements that are now a powerful force. These 'authoritarian populisms', racialized nationalisms, gendered ethnoreligious nationalisms, neo-fascisms, and indeed some clearly fascist movements extolling racial, gender, or Christian supremacy are mobilizing to preserve the culture and country of the 'real people' who feel victimized, challenged, and face demise. A basic fault of modern political economies has been the fundamental conflict between political democracy, majority rule, and/or rules of law and the economic anarchy, which privileges a few while many face duress; these conditions lead to the irrationality and scapegoating, especially racism, sexism, and ethnocentrism flourish to foster a variety of authoritarian, reactionary mobilizations across the globe.

In the early throes of the U.S. counter-cultural movement of the 1960s, Bob Dylan sang, "You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows." Less a critique of experts than a commentary on the observable cross-currents in U.S. (and global) politics and culture at the time, Dylan slyly paid homage to the capacities of average citizens to find their own way through the mess, while indicting a heavy-handed government consolidating power in a world gone wrong. Like then, we find ourselves in a world that is seemingly going wrong at every turn and with no dearth of heavy-handed governments. We see this each time we compulsively reach for our phones or turn on our computers, get our daily drip of division, distraction, or news (a 24/7 version of the two minutes of hate in Orwell's 1984 coupled with a steady supply of soma from A Brave New World), check our feeds, or resend someone's 150 characters of revelation. If these things fail to satiate one's penchant for pain or desire to confirm the end times, then we can get a concentrated version of the malaise when the person in the position of president of the U.S. tweets, often multiple times per day, an alphabet soup of very rarely coded nativism, isolationism, conspiracy theories, and wounded white male entitlement. Unlike the time in which the young Dylan briefly railed, it seems we would not trust the insight of a meteorologist (or any expert, for that matter) even when we need it, much less have a basic hope in the capacities of others to help us through the thicket that is the current political and cultural landscape. Or, so we are instructed: Be afraid, be distrustful and, most of all, be aggrieved. Outside of an insightful run of books by Giroux over the past two decades, very little has been said about the role of schooling and education, more broadly, in challenging the great fracture and regression. This special issue seeks, admittedly in a modest way, to begin broader conversations about the role of schooling and education in enriching democracy and challenging reactionary populisms.